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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

SOUTHEAST FURNITURE COMPANY,
Respondent_,
Brief
vs.

No. 9175

GRANI'TE HOLDING COMPANY,
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent takes issue with most of the statements
and the conclusions contained in Appellant's "Statement
of Facts.''
There are some facts reflected by the record which
are not in dispute, namely: The deed which appellant
made and delivered to respondent at the time respondent purchased the property now occupied by respondent's
furniture store, contained a grant of a "floating" right
of way, to be furnished to respondent by appellant (R.
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140). The driveway as now located is 33 feet wide (north
and south) and 170 feet long (east and west) entering McClelland Street on the west. It adjoins and runs
parallel to a strip of ground owned by appellant on the
north. The title to the east 40 feet of the driveway as
now located is and has for many years been vested in
appellant, and the title to the west 130 feet is vested in
respondent, the same having been acquired by respondent
from Clara L. Cracroft by deed on May 14th, 1941.
Shortly after respondent acquired said property respondent at its own expense hard-surfaced the driveway and
respondent has ever since resurfaced and maintained
the right of way without any part of such expense having
been paid by appellant, respondent has paid all taxes
on that part of the right of way title to which is vested
in respondent. Appellant has never offered to pay anything toward the maintenance of the driveway. (R. 149)
It is evident that .appellant reserved, by its deed to
respondent covering that property on which respondent's business is operated which carried a right of way
title to property running northerly and southerly along
a railroad right of way, the right to relocate that right
of way from time to time if and as the necessity or
convenience of appellant or those claiming or to claim
under appellant and its successors in estate shall require
a deviation in the course or location of the driveway.
(Ex. 1-P)
The basic fact in dispute is the contention of appellant that a representative of appellant corporation, Nephi
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J. Hansen and a representative of respondent corporation, S. C. Sorensen, both of whom are now deceased,
entered into an oral agreement in the year 1942 granting
their respective corporations reciprocal easements over
the driveway in dispute.
The appellant has attempted to broaden the scope
of its action beyond the limits of its pleadings by contending for and producing purported evidence of an
implied agreement, estoppel and dedication of a public
way. Their motion to amend their pleading following
the trial to include these other theories to establish a
joint right of way was properly denied by the court.
Before considering the points relied upon by Appellant, we answer some other matters mentioned in Appellant's "Statement of Facts.''
Appellant argues that the way has been used as a
public street, but there is no evidence supporting such
contention. The evidence shows that the public generally
did not make use of the driveway, but the only ones
making use thereof are appellant and appellant's tenants.
Appellant's witnesses testified that they made use of
the driveway for delivery purposes but their customers
did not make use of it. (R. 142)
'The record does not support the statement of appellant on page 3 that the closing of the old right of way
would relieve respondent from a possible encroachment
claim by a land owner who stood to gain by the closing
of the driveway. This statement is but a bare conclusion
of appellant.
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Appellant further states at page 3 of its brief that
counsel for respondent agrees that if appellant had
asked for a right of way deed at a conversation purportedly had between the late Messrs. Hansen & Sorenson, both deceased, that it would have been given, and
therefore, it was so intended. In the first place we contend the record is in error. It is respondent's contention
that the word "you" was used by counsel for respondent
in his cross examination of appellant's witness and not
the word "I." Even if the record correctly reflected the
question as recorded, it is evident that no deed was ever
given, therefore, the right given by respondent to appellant to use appellant's property was nothing more than
a permissive right revocable at the will of respondent.
Witness Hansen admits he should have asked for a deed
to the right of way (R. 150).
Neither does the record bear out the statement of
appellant that the closing of that right of way conveyed
by appellant to respondent irrevocably c1osed the right
of way and extinguished the only means of access to
McClelland from appellant's property. Appellants in
anticipation of being called upon by respondent and
others at some time, to perform under its deed and
furnish a right of way by relocation, acquired property
adjoining the present way on the North (R. 127, 128).
Witness Richards and appellant had protected themselves against the possibility of being cut off from the
present way.
At page 8 of appellant's brief appellant states that
it acquired the property adjoining the drive way here
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in que:stion in desperation and as a possible escape in
the event the respondent should prevail and to insure
apJJellant's ability to perfonn its prior and long standing obligation to others to provide them a right of way.
This argument is conceding the correctness of respondent's position. One of those to whom appellant is obligated to provide a right of way is respondent.
Appellant states that if it is denied a permanent
right over respondent's property it will be irreparably
damaged. There is no showing in the record that appellant would be damaged if it were denied the right to
the use of respondent's property, appellant having made
provisions to protect itself against damage by acquiring
property adjoining that property here in question on
the North.
Appellant lays great weight to that evidence which
the court permitted to come into the record over objection of counsel for respondent to the effect that in 1942
an effort was made by the late Messrs. Hansen &
Sorenson to have the way accepted by the city of Salt
Lae City as a public street.
There is nothing in the record which shows any
transaction on the part of respondent company to take
such action, there is no executed deed, there is no competent evidence to such effect, that evidence which was
received is nothing but hearsay, and incompetent. If
this evidence were to be given consideration, the logical
conclusion would be that the Respondent sought the
dedication in order to be relieved of the burden of main-
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tenance, for which it had the sole and exclusive responsibility.
At page 5 appellant states the evidence shows there
were no signs posted on the property for more than
10 years subsequent to 1952. Appellant's witnesses admit
there was a sign posted in 1945 (R. 102). No objection
was made by appellant when the sign was posted. Witness Bill Hansen testified that "he didn't feel it applied
to us." (R. 146)
The evidence that signs had been posted at the
McClelland Street entrance to the way in 1945 is uncontradicted, therefore, no legal rights had been acquired
by appellant to that time unless the rights could be
shown by oral agreement.
At page 5 (R. 145) appellant makes it appear that
bad feelings existed between officers of appellant and
respondent, but we submit that the only evidence of disagreement shown is that Bill Hansen, an officer of
appellant company objected to Mr. H. A. Sorensen, an
officer of respondent company, having hard topping
put on that part of the driveway title to which is in
appellant without first having obtained the consent of
appellant, but nothing more.

POINT I.
Appellant's principal contention point I is based
on its counterclaim Paragraph 2 at page 3 (R. 11, R.
64) wherein appellant alleges as follows:
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"It was further agreed that the right of way
would be used and maintained by plaintiff and
defendant jointly.''
It is admitted by appellant that it has paid nothing
toward maintenance of the way (R. 149). Therefore,
even provided appellant could establish the agreement
contended for, by its own admission it failed to perform
its part of the agreement.
Appellant does not rely on a prescriptive right, but
relies entirely on an oral agreement to establish a right
of way to encumber the property of respondent with a
permanent easement. In order to prove such an agreement appellant relies on testimony of witnesses incompetent under the laws of the State of Utah to testify.
As to the competency of witnesses, Section 78-24-2
(3) UCA 1953 on who may not be witnesses reads as
follows:
"A party to any civil action, suit, or proceeding, and any person directly interested in
the event thereof, and any person from, through
or under whom such party or interested person
derived his interest, or title or any part thereof,
when the adverse party in such action, suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends, as
guardian of an insane or incompetent person, or as
the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or
devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian,
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by,
or transacmon with, such deceased, insane or 1mcompetent person, or matter of fact whatever,
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whiJch must have been equally wiJthin the knowledge of both the witness and such insa;ne, incompetent or decease1d person, unless such w~tness ~s
called to testify thereto by such adverse party so
daimimg or opposing, su~ng or defending, ~n such
actiJon, suit or procee,divng." (italics added)
Timely objection was made to appellant's witnesses
who were permitted to testify. The testimony given by
appellant's witnesses clearly shows the importance of
the rule and the reason for same.

POINT II
Under Point II appellant contends that by its having
shown performance, on the part of appellant, of its
obligation under the purported agreement by the removal
of some sheds the statute of frauds does not apply.
By appellant removing a few sheds appellant was
only doing that which it was already legally obligated
to do in furnishing that property over which the driveway was established for convenience. Because respondent was at the time willing to permit the temporary use
of its property in the relocation, even had there been
an agreement as contended for by plaintiff, this does
not constitute performance of the agreement contended
for inasmuch as appellant was as heretofore stated,
legally obligated to furnish a right of way to respondent,
still such act on the part of respondent did not pass
any legal right for a permanent use of respondent's
property to appellant.
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The attention of the Court is further directed to
the fact that as heretofore stated, appellant admits by
its pleadings that if an agreement had been entered into
as contended for, appellant was obligated to pay a portion of the maintenance of the driveway and appellant's
witnesses admitted that appellant had paid nothing toward such maintenance.
It is most unreasonable to presume that respondent
would give over four times more property than that given
by appellant, pay taxes thereon and pay the total cost
of improving and maintaining the driveway for the benefit of appellant as is contended for by appellant.
The cases cited by appellant under Point II are not
applicable, because appellant did not show performance
of an agreement which would take the case out of the
statute of frauds.
Under Section 25-5-1 UCA 1953 the law is stated
as follows:
"No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law,
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunder authorized by writing."
In 49 Am. J ur. - Statute of Frauds, Section 182
at page 513 the law is stated as follows:
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"It is universally held that an easement is
an 'interest' within the meaning of statutes which
follow in effect the English statute prohibiting
the creation by parol of any 'interest' in real
property and requiring any contract for the sale
of any 'interest' therein to be in writing, and
therefore, that the creation of an agreement to
create an easement is within the statute."
Had it not been evident that appellant was legally
obligated under its deed to respondent to furnish resepondent with a right of way and had appellant and its
successors not reserved the right by said deed to relocate
the right of way, then appellant's position and argument
might carry some weight, but appellant cannot ignore
its obligation to respondent under the provision of its
deed.

POINT III
As to appellants Point III on Estoppel, the cases
relied upon and the argument made by appellant might
apply to that case where there appeared no legal obligation on the part of the party who would invoke the
rule to furnish a right of way, but the same do not apply
to the case at issue.
The fact that respondent officers might have observed tearing down of some sheds by appellant could
not under any circumstance of this case act to estop
respondent from defending its title to its land when
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appellant was already obligated by deed to furnish re~pondent with a right of way.
Appellant argues that the sign 1n evidence (Ex.
P. 5) is not that sign first posted on the property. The
sign which is in evidence bears the same wording as
one previously placed at the entrance of the driveway
as was testified to by witness, J. Gordon Sorenson
(R. 161).
POINT IV
The same argument which is made to appellant's
Point III is applicable to its Point IV.

POINT V
As to Point V of appellant's brief, there is no presumption that a right to use respondents property exists
inasmuch as the use has not been for the statutory
period, this even if no sign had been posted on the
property. Therefore the evidence to establish appellant's
claim of an agreement must be clear and convincing.
The law is jealous of a claim to an easement, 28 CJS
Sec. 68. P. 734.
Appellant has not shown that the way is by necessity. Appellant has not pleaded nor relied on a right
of way by necessity but relies wholly on an oral agreement.
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Appellant has not cited a Utah case in support of its
argument under Point V and it is our opinion that the
Utah Courts have not adopted the rule of law relied on
by appellant but on the contrary our courts have required one relying on use or on implied agreement to
have made use of the way adversely to the owner of
the servient estate for the required period to have acquired a right of way by prescription.
The Utah cases cited by appellant under its Point
V are not in point, the cases cited apply to boundary
line cases and not rights of way.
POINT VI
As stated under respondent's opening argument
there is no competent evidence to support appellant's
argument under its Point VI. There is no evidence of
public use of the way as contended to establish a
right of way under Section 27-1-2 UCA 1953 but on the
contrary appellant's witnesses testified that its tenants
used the same, but not the customers of its tenants. The
evidence even if admissible would show that the city
refused to accept the way as a dedicated public thoroughfare and therefore if there was an agreement made by
the officers of appellant and respondent to dedicate the
way as a public street the same failed.
POINT VII
Much of appellant's argument under its Point VII
is not supported by evidence, but contrary to the argu-
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ment of appellant the evidence which is corroborated
by one of appellant's own witnesses is to the effect that
signs were posted for 1nany years, in fact from the
time of acquisition by respondent of its property. Appellant's witness, Richards, even testified to a chain having
been placed across the way at a point where appellant's
property adjoined the property of respondent (R. 119).
POINT VIII
Regarding Point VIII the record shows a default
certificate having been entered on October 22, 1958 but
judgment was not entered until January 27, 1959. Respondent's Motion to set aside the default judgment
was filed February 6, 1959 which was well within the
three (3) month period provided under Rule 60 b. Appellant would have the court read into Rule 60 b the word
"default" where the word ''judgment" appears.
Attention is here directed to the fact that the default
was entered on a counterclaim. A counterclaim on which
appellant's action is predicated which was not served
on respondent as required by Rule 5 but the same was
mailed to the attorney for respondent.
The courts do not favor judgments by default (Utah
Com. & Sav. vs. Trumbo, 17 U 198 footnoted under Rule
55 (a) (1). Especially is this true of defaults entered
on counterclaims where as in this case it is evident that
respondent had a meritorious defense to the counterclaim. Then too, it is clearly evident that that which
appellant calls a counterclaim was not in fact a counter-
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claim, it added nothing new to that pleading which
appellant had already filed as its answer. That is to
say while the answer of appellant as amended does
contain that which they title a counterclaim, technically
it is not a counterclaim at all and requires no answer.
Then too, while we are mindful of the fact that
it is the practice among attorneys here in this district
to but mail a counterclaim to counsel of record for
respondent, still such service does not meet the requirement of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5 (b)
( 1) permitting service upon a party by mailing to his
attorney is not applicable where a counterclaim is interposed.
In further support of this statement we cite Rule
55 (a) (2) which reads as follows:
''Notice to Party of Default. After the entry
of the default on any party, as provided in subdivision (a) (1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice or
paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as prov~ded i'n Rule 5 (a)."
And we find Rule 5 (a) reading as follows : Service.
When Required.
"Every order required by its terms to be
served, every pleading subsequent to the original
complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every written
motion other than one which may be heard ex

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
parte, and every written notice, appearance, denland, offer of judg1nent, designation of record
on appeal, and other papers requiring service
shall be served upon each of the parties affected
thereby, but no service need be made on part~es
in default or fiailure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief
against them shall be served upon them in the
manner provided for service of summons in
Rule 4."
If the counterclaim does in fact assert a new or
additional claim for relief on behalf of defendant and
against plaintiff then the counterclaim must be served
upon the plaintiff as a summons is served and not upon
its attorney by mailing a copy thereof to the attorney.
"The allowance of a vacation of a judgment
is a creature of equity designed to relieve
against harshness of enforcing a judgment which
may occur through procedural difficulties, the
wrongs of the opposing party or misfortunes
which prevent the presentation of a claim or
defense."
Citing Warren vs Dixon, U t.ah, 260 P2d 741.
The Warren case further states as annotated: "The
rule that the courts will incline towards granting relief
to a party who has not had an opportunity to present his
case is ordinarily applied at the trial court level."
In the vV arren case the court speaking through Mr.
Justice ~IcDonough says at page 743 :
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"The difficulty facing the trial court upon
a motion to vacate the judgment lies in the fact
that a compromise between two valid considerations must be selected. A rule which would permit the re-opening of cases previously decided
because of error or ignorance during the progress
of the trial would in a large measure vitiate
the affects of res judicata and create a hardship
to the successful litigant in causing him to prosecute his action more than once and possibly lose
the ability to collect his judgment; on the other
hand, the court is .anxious to protect the losing
party who has not had the opport111Ybity to present
his claim or defense. Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the court will
incline toward grantzng relief in a .doubtful cas~e
~o the end that the pa·rty may have a henring.
Otting Hurd v. For.d, 74 Utah 46. (Italics added).
There can he no hardship claimed by appellant in
the instant case nor is appellant in any danger of loosing
any right to collect its judgment should the Court grant
Respondent's motion, there being no money judgment
involved.
In the Hur.d v. Ford case we find 8 of the syllabus
reading as follows :
"Judgment-Discretion to relieve from Default
judgment 1nust be exercised in furtherance of
Justice, and Court will Incline toward granting
relief in doubtful case ( Comp. Laws 1917, Sec.
6619). The discretion lodged in court by Comp.
Laws 1917, Sec. 6619, to set aside default or relieve party from default judgment, is to be exercised in furtherance of justice, and court will
1
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incline toward granting relief in doubtful case to
end that party Inay have a hearing."
Now Hule 60 b is substantially the smne as former
seetion 104-14-4 Utah Code 1943 and we find section
1-l:-1-l:--l- taken frmn Sec. 6619, Laws of Utah, 1917.
Our Courts have said no general rule can be laid
down respecting discretion to be exercised by trial court
in setting aside or refusing to set aside judgment by
default; each case must necessarily depend on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances, but .discretion sho~tld
always be so exercised ras to promote ends of j1tstice.
In Ut.ah Commercial & Savings Bk. v Trumbo, 17
U. 198, 53 P. 1033, the law is stated as follows:
"Power of trial court to set aside judgments
by default should be exercised liberally to end
that causes may be tried on their merits, and
where circumstances which led to default are
such as to cause court to hesitate, doubt should
be resolved in favor of application for setting
aside judgment rendered on default."
In footnote to Rule 55 (a) (1) note 10 we find the
following:
"While granting or refusing applications to
open and set aside defaults is addressed to court's
sound discretion, yet power should be exercised
freely and liberally."
Our Courts have not deviated from the rule of
law laid down in the setting aside of defaults.
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There is nothing in the instant case from which
appellant could have assumed that plaintiff had abandoned its case even though appellant argues the matter
had been pending since 1954. It is evident there has
been negotiations for settlement between the parties for
many years and even after the ease found its way into
the office of the present counsel for appellant. Counsel
for appellant argues that respondent did nothing to
press the case to conclusion. What prejudice has appellant shown in the case not having been brought to trial
sooner~ None at all. Had respondent pressed the case
for trial at a time and before the counter-claim of appellant was filed which was not filed until a few months
before trial, respondent would not have been faced with
the necessity of this proceeding. If there was any prejudice because of delay it appears that respondent is
the one who has been prejudiced in being forced to a
trial of the case.
POINT IX
As to Point IX, if error was committed by the trial
court it was prejudicial to respondent and not to appellant. All the evidence offered by appellant vv-as received
over objection of counsel for respondent and it must
be presumed inasmuch as the court did not rule out
the evidence that the court considered same.
POINT X
Regarding Point X, appellant contends that the
court erred in not finding on all issues before the court.
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The court found there was no agreement to create a
joint right of way. This was the only issue raised by
the pleadings which was before the court. The court
denied appellant's motion to amend its complaint and
therefore there was no issue as to the contention of
appellant that there was a dedicated public thoroughfare.
There is ample evidence in the record to support
the findings of the court, the only issue before the court
being whether there was an oral agreement entered into
between appellant and respondent to encumber respondnt's property with a permanent right of way.

CON·CLUSION
Appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of
evidence that there was an oral agreement between
appellant and respondent to burden respondent's land
with a permanent right of way. The court properly
entered judgment finding and determining that there was
no such agreement.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MILTON V. BACKMAN of
Backman, Backman & Clark,
ALTON C. MELVILLE,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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